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Thesis.
Property Rirlhts of Mari'ied Vomen
with
Special Reference to the Legislation in New York.
Charles P. R Zan,
C o rn e i 1 U n i v e r s i t y,
School of Law,

Leg:inning in 1331.) 'ississippi leading, the legis-
latures of the several states of this Union have been
gradually but sulely re, virlp the legal disabilities
which have oppressed mar,--ied %-[omen throughout the com-
mon law system of jurisprudence, since the introduction
of the Teudal System...
As a result of this ler:islation married women's
statutes, so calleci, are to-hay univel-sal. These stat-
utes of the various states, thov<h having for their de-
sip:n the accomplis hment o" t1!e sare general object, the
abrogation of all power of control on the part of the
husband over the wife's Fproperty, are by no means uni-
form in their provisions.
The purpose of this essay is to trace: briefly the
rules governinr the propert,, rights of ,,iarried women
as they existed at common la, and in equity; and to stu-
dy as closely as an article of this character will pe'-
itt)the effects of the more important married viomen's
separate property acts which have emanat, d from the Leg-
islature of _.ew York.
The Common Law System.
Personal Property in Possession.
At cormmon law marriage vests in the husband an ab-
solute title of all the wife's personal property which is
in possession. This is true whether the wife has ac-
tual or beneficial possession; whether the property is
that of the wife at the time of mav'iape, or subsequently
becomes hers by gift, bequest, purchase or as a result
of her labor. The husband may make any disposition of
it, with or without consent of the wife. Once arried,
her title to this property is forfeiteu ania she can re-
-ain it only by the will of hei- husband.
If the wife survives the husband, and no disposi-
tion has been made of thds property, it passes to the
husband's pe 4sonal representatives.
Choses in Action.
Marriage acts not as an absolute but as a qualified
gift, to ;.he husband, of the wife's choses in action.
To make his title complete he must reduce the choses
to possession auring coverture.
in case he dies before taking the steps necessary
to reduce them to possession she, and not his pe 'son-
al representatives, is entitled to the property. If
the aif. dies belsure the husband leavinf- choses in action,
unreduced to possession durinr coverture, the ripht of
the husband, as such to make them h&,s own, ceases.
Lut by the statute of 29 Charles II. he was entitled to
administer on her estate, and as her administrator to
recover and re.uuce to possession all her cho.-es in ac-
tion, if any, still outstanding and after first paying
therewith any debts contracted by her before marriage,
to retain the 1r'sidue as his own property.
Wlienever it becomes necessary for a husband to seek
the assistance of a court of equity to obtain -ossession
of his wife's choses, Equity in pursuance of the maxim
that "he who seeks equity must do equity" will compel
hiq to make a suitable provision, for his wife and her
chiluren, known 's the wife's equity of settlement.
Chattels Real.
£lie husband has a qualified interest, also, in the
chattels real of his wife. The law gives him power,
without- ier consent, to sell, mortgage or otherw- ise
dispose or incumber the same at his pleasure.
Chattels real unappropriated during coverture vest
in the wife absolutely after the death of the husband.
if the wife dies bef re the husband their go to the hus-
bznd. in thnis respect they resemble choses in action.
Lut an important distinction exists between the right
by whi;Ii the husband claims, at the death of the wife,
choses in action unreduced anu chattels real unappropri-
ated. The former, we have seen, go to the husband in a
iepresentative capacity', while the latter vest in the
husband as such. lHe does not hold tl evi by force of
statute as aaministrator the avails of which are to be
applieL to the pau'mnet of his debts. ;.e holds the-.,, as
his own; it being one of his marital rights that his
wife's chattels real, upon hei' death shall belong to
hii-i absolutely.
T.,e chattels real may also be levied upon under ex-
ecution for the debts of the husband wiile the cover-
ture lasts. By this process the title becomes trans-
ferrea to the creditor; -nd the wife is permanently dis-
possessed of her chattels real, even though she s hould
survive her h-sband.
if the husband makes a lease of the wife's term and
before expiration of the lease aies, the per-sonal rep-
resentatives of the husband .re entitled to the rent.
Though the husband by will cannot prevent the wife's
enjoyment of her chattels real if she survives hir., still
it hams been held that a lease, made b'r the husba-d to
.ake effect imeuiately upon his death, is valid, and
the wifes interest is barred until the termination of
the lease.
Real Property.
The hiusband acquires by marriage the usufruct of all
the freehold estate of the wife.
property is a freehold. During
"As estate in such
their joint lives he
takes absolutely the rents, issues and profits that ac-
crue during coverture. if unreducea to possession dur-
ing coverture, he may maintain suit to recover rents and
profits which had accrued while coverture lasted.
1: unreauceu durinpr his life, they pass to his Personal
representatives, the wife not beinp entitled to recover
them.
ThouEh the husband's interest in his wife's real
estate is liable for his debts, still nothing more than
the husbant's u;s)fruct is thereby affected. 11or can
any disposition of the property b,, the husband or his
creditors defeat the wife's ultimate title. In case
the real estate of the wife is converted, durin7 her
life, into personalty bY voluntary acts of the parties
such personalty becomes tie rope- ty of the husband.
If the .iif- survives, she is aain the sole owner
of her lands, and the heirs and personal representatives
of the husband have no interest in -hem. At the wifeIs
dea.th, the husband surviving, no child having been born
capable of' inheriting, the husband's interest ceased.
But if such child has been born, the surviving husband
becomes vested with a life interest in all her lands,
known as his curtesy estate.
Sur'viving Wife's Rights.
The question now arises, what interest did the wife
Fain. by marriage, in the property of her husband? No
vested interest was acquired; but ti]arriage did at once
confer upon her an inchoate right in his estate which be-
caz:e consumate at his death, she surviving. This was
the well known provision termed dower, consisting of a
life estate in one-third 7art of the real property of
inheritance of which the husband was seized at any time
during coverture, in which the wife had not conveyed her
right of dower. It was not necessary, as it .ias in case
of curtesy, thIt- a chilci should actually have been born;
and while the husband might have a rif-ht o-" curtesy in
trust estates, le-al seisen wras necessary to support
a O 1].
it will be seen that this estate of the wife dif-
fers materially from the cui-tesy estate of the husband.
in addition to dower, by the comron law :hich ree-
mained in force till the reip-ri of Charles 1. the widow
aas entitled tu one-thif'd, and if he left no children
to one-half,of her husband's personalty. !7uccessive
statutes changea tilis so that at the begin :ing of the
eighteenth century a husband could bequeath his entire
pe;-sonal estate if he desired.
This sulmxlary inaicates, 1 think, it outline at least,
the clianres effected by marri--,F:e in the prOperty rig:hts
For almost a century' after
Elackstone few essential alterations were made bY leg-
islaTeiven Euaettmennt.
The Equitable Doctrine.
As a result of these harsh, inflexible and, in many
cases, unjust principles of the conmon law, Equity, al-
ways anxiuus to prevent haruship, interposed the doctrine
of trusts and ei-abled a woman oA-0 her friends to place,
between her ana her husband a trustee against whom the hus,
band could assert no riphts in property cofiveyed to the
"sole and separate use" of the ;wi.'e. This estate may
be created at any time, before o-" aurill-' coverture;
and in any kind of prorverty, real or personal. No par-
ticular fomn of words is necessary; but an intention to
of womeln at Goiii,-on lavi.
exclud> the husband must be unequivocally expressed.
If no trustee is designated, a court of equity will de-
clare the husband a trustee, and his marital rights at
cormion law iill be dis-)laced by his duties as trustee
in equity.
in rlution to her spearra~e estte the wife's posi-
tion wouleu be entirely changed from that ass i-rned at
cormion law. ier cont-acts, void in a court of law,
v oula in a court, of equity be valid and enforceable
against her spearate Dstte. Although, as is %iell known,
a wife could no* sue o-,- be sued at covrmon law, in equity
in regard to her separate estate both could be done.
This doctrine oripinating as early as the four-
teenth century, was .;ell settled in England in 1095
(Drake vs. Storr, 2 Freem. 205); and was enforced there
and in this country, under proper circumstances, until
legislation rendered its application no long;er necessary.
Under the Statutes of Ne,'z York.
Although j:ississippi aas the first state to leIis-
late un this question, her act of 133 . .-jas merely pe-
missive and lacked the libe>':l features which has char-
acterized subsequent-le,islation. Several states soon
joined the movement notable among themfor completeness
of change being -Paine and Mlichigan which acted in 1344.
In !Lew York the first radical change affecting the
p'operty rights of married women was made in 1843. Pre-
vious to 1840 theire had been a str'ong public feeling
that the wife shoulci be relievd' of an opprlssive lg
which placed her, as regards property batte's, in a posi-
tion extremely inferior to that of her husband.
Cunstitutional Convention which sat in 1346 t.his was a
prominent topic of debate, and the substance _f the sub-
sequent act of 1343 was at one tie incorporated in the
: roject of the new Constitution but was finally defeated.
Public sentitnent was by no means smothered by this
action of the convention. The advocates of reform in
this direction brought their influence to bear on the
legislature, the result of that influence being in th.
first instance the Act of 1343.
This Act of 134L (Laws of 1843, ch. 200) was far
umore sweeping in its provisions than had been the leg-
islation in any state prior to this time. It extin-
guished all the comnon law rights (,f the husband in re-
spect of the wife's property. Henceforth the wife was
In the
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sole owner of all property, real and personal which
she should own at marriiare, and of' all which should be-
comes hers by any title during coverture. it attempted
to divest rig-hts alread vested in the husband under the
cormnon law, but this provision provea ineffectual being
declared unconstitutional and void. Westervelt vs.
Gregg, 12 2]. Y., 202; Ryder vs. Hulse, 24 1. Y., 372.
This Act was amended by Laws of 1849, Chap. 375
and though now in the main superceded by later statutes,
it has influenced subsequent legislation in this -and
other states and is to-day frequently cited by the courts.
Curtesy.
By the third section of the original Act, a wife
'Jas empowered to receive from any pef'son, other than her
husband, property of any description; but no power to
dipose of that propei'ty was given her, leaving the hus-
band's claim at her death precisel'y as it was before the
statute.
The Amendment of 1349, conferred upon the wife au-
thority to "convey and devise real and pe'sonal property,
and any interest or estate thel'ein, and the rents, is-
sues and profits thereof in the same manner and with like
effect as if she were unmarried." This plainly gave the
wife power to defeat the husband's right of curtesy if
any such right remained.
It was at first declared b, the Supreme Cuurt,
(Eillings vs. Billings, 2 Yrb. 343) Potter, J. writ-
ing an exhaustive opinion, tat the husband's curtesy
right had been entirely abrogated by the statute.
However plausible the reasoning of Justice Potter,
when a few years later the question again came before
the Supreme Court a different rule was enunciated.
ratter of Winne, 2 Lansing, 21. In this case the court
say it cannot be denied that the legislature possessea
the power to deprive the husband of all right jure Ux-
oris and as tenant by curtesy initiate, and still pre-
serve the ri-ht of the husband to the tenancy to cur-
tesy consumate.
This is in accordance with the weight of authority;
and in Hatfielu vs. Sneden (54 37. Y., 230) the law is
saia to be substantially settled, that while the Acts
of 1843 and 134 , excluded the husband during life from
control of or interference with his ;ife's separate real
and personal estate and gave her alone the power of dis-
position by deed or will, yet they left him tue right of
curtesy in h:r real property a-cL of acministration for
his own benefit of her personalty in so much as remained
at her death undisposed of and unbequeathed . Tis may
safely be saiu to be the law of this State, respecting
curtesy, to-day.
A . re"'a-'ds the jife's personalty the most recent
case on this point (Robbins vs. i-c Clure, 100 1'. Y. 323)
holds, that where a ma -iicd woin dies intestate and leav-
ing no descendants, the rule of the common law is still
in full force and the husbanu is entitled to the person-
al estate of his wife, undisposeu of at h- r des th, by
virtue c. his marital right, as well as his right of ad-
.inistrat ion. 7Vr ere descendants are left, the husband
ta: es t_-e saie portion of his deceased wife's personalty,
as his widowi woul be entitled to in like cases.
Ransom vs. Uic> is, 2. 11. Y. i10.
2.,rnes vs. Unde-,.,wocd, 47 1].
_.,1 3.51.
f-iannei- of Charrinr wife's "'state.
it has been state that previous to legislation a
-arrieu woman's contracts made in reference to her sep-
arate estate 'aere binding in equity. Still, on no
branch cf the entire subject under consideration, has
there been Creater conflict of opinion, both in equity
and, until a recent date, under the statutes than as to
what acts of the wife ,iould bind her property.
Lishop treating generally of this point says:
11r.
"Since
the confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel, there
has been nothing more noteworthy, in the sai'e line, than
the discordant :nd ever shiftinr utterances of the ju-
dicial mind on ti-is subject." This remark is pecul-
iarly applicable to the decisions in !ev York.
The great authority prior to the statutes was the
case of Jaques vs. 1L1ethodist Episcopal Church. As
Mothodist Episcopal Church vs. Jaques (3 Johns. Ch. '73)
it came before the Chancery Court in 1817. Here Chan-
cellor Kent in an elaborate opinion, after an exhaustive
review of the English cases, hulds that a married woman
can charge her separate estate onlr -ihen power to so
charade is given her in the instrument creating- her separate
estate. This doctrine of 'ent was subsequently over-
ruled in the Court of Errors (17 Johns. 543) where the
position is taken that a married woman may act as a
feme sole in respect to her- separate property, except so
far as she is restr'ained by the instrument in which the
estate is created. This :.ule, ,,,ith considerable rigor,
was applieu by the courts until 1848.
Under the statutes already noticed it was clear
that the liability could be onforced when c-'eated in car-
rying on a trade or business of the wife, (Frecking vs.
Iolland, 56 . ., 422); o. ,here the contract related
to, oi, was made for the benefit of' hei, separate estate.
(Owen vs. Cawley, 30 !'.. Y., 600; Ballin vs. Dillaye, 37
N. Y., $5.)
When the debt was one not contracted on her own
account, Aor he- own benefit or for the benefit of her
separate estate, the rule in ,his State though adopted
deliberately by the courts was far from satisfactory.
On this question, the case of Yale vs. Dereder has been
under the statutes what Jaques vs. Methodist Episcopal
Church was under the equitable theory. feginning in
i'58, in 18' !. Y. , 265 this celebrated and much crit-
icised case has three times reached the highest court of
the State.
At its first consideration it was decided that in
order for a marr-ied woman to charge her separate estate
with a debt not contracte for the benefit of such es-
tate, it was necessary that there should be evidence of
an intention thus to charge it, and that a note or other
obligation was not sufficient evidence. In 22 N. Y.,
450, its second appearance, Selden, J. held that the in-
tention to chage the separate estate must be declared
in the very contract which is the foundation of the chare.
The last appearance of this case is in 333 '. Y., 329.
Church, C. J., writing the opinion of the court follows
the ' -evious decisions, though doubtinF their propri-
ety, and says: "There is every reason for referring this
question to the legislative power, to detelmine definite-
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ly what rule shall finally prevail."
This suggestion was not acted upon until 1384, when
b-Y Chap. 381 of the Ljaws of that year the following is
provided:
Section 1. A married woman may contract to the same
extent,and cjith like effectand in the same form as if
unmarried and she and her separate estate shall be lia-
ble thei-eon, whether such contract relates to her sep-
arate business or estate or otherwise, and in no case
shall a charge upon her separate estate be necessary.
Wife's Right of Compensation for Services.
Lavrs of 1860, Chap. 90, as amended by the Laws of
1862, Chap. 172 supercedes the Acts of 1343 and 1349 and
was evidently drawn so as to avoid the unconstitutional
feature noticed in the Act-of 1848.
Section 2 o-' the Act provides: A married woman .ay
carry on any trade or business and perform any labor or
services on her sole and separate account, and the earn-
ings of any married woman, from her trade, business, la-
bor or service shall be hel sole ana separ:ate property,
and nal be usea or invested by her in her oven name.
To quote from Judige Earl (93 N. Y., 2,4), "It was
the purpose of those provisi ns to secure to a married
woman, free f'om the control of her husband, the earnings
and p.'ofits of her own business and of her own labor and
services, carried on and performed on her sole and separ-
ate account, which at commi-on law would have belonr--ed to
her husband. "
What constitutes "earnings of any married woman from
her trade, business, labor or services" within the mean-
inm of this statute is often a question of importance,
not to the husbanu and wife alone, but to their respec-
tive creditors. Certain it is that a rvar'riea woman
i,-ay independent of ier husband engage in any business or
labor the profits of which are her property, free from
all claims of her husband as such and from her husband's
creditors. lo doubt attempts -,are frequently made to
use this statute as a protection against claims of the
husband's creditors, and property is conveyed to the wife
as compensation for services wihich, if creditors were
not interested, would b. considered unworthy of compen--
sation. These colorable transactions find no favor
with the courts and trnsfers of property from husband
to wifc as recompense for services rendered in their
home, though made in perfect good faith, have at the
suit of the husband's creditors been declared void.
A case in point is Coleman vs. Burr'. (C3 N. Y. , 17).
Here, an action was broupht by defendant's creditors
to iet asiae a deed made by defenaant Bui'r to his wife,
throurh.
a Tpihj* person, on the ground that the deed was made
to hinder, delay and defr-aud creditors. The consid-
eration -or the conveyance was the wife's services in
caring for the invalid mother of the husband. The ref-
eree found that the services were irksome and laborious
and the transaction was fair a -i honest.
declared the conveyance voidsaying: "VI
The court
lhatevecr services
a vife renders in her home for her husband cannot be
on her sole and separate account." While it may be
asserted that were a different construction put upon this
and similar contl- cts, the temptation to perpetrate fraud
would be too apparent and too available to be resistecl,yet
the; injustice of the decision in this case must be ad-
mi t e .
Vit'iker vs. Whitaker, 52 IA. Y. , 368.
Reynonlds vs. Robinson, 64 N. ., 53().
'here creditors are not interested the tendency
is to allow the husband to relinquish to his wife his
right to her' earnings, in his own household, so that she
can hold them to her separate use. I.-tter of Kimmzer and
Gay, 14 N. Y.,St. Rep., 618.
Conveyances betw.-een Husband and ,'life.
Alth .ugh the Act of 1349 cteclares that a wife may
convey and devise real and personal property in the same
manner and with like efect as if she were unmarl-ied, the
Court of Appeals in two cases held that this did not give
her power to make a deed airect tc her husband. White vs.
Wagner 25 E. Y. ,30; Winains vs. Peebles, 32 N. Y.,
423. it was aduitteQ that there was undoubtedly an in-
tention to confer upon the iwfe, in respect to convey-
ances of her property, the legal capacity of -a fame sole;
but as tnis precise question could not arise in respect
to a feme sole it was thought that such a conveyance
could not be permitted.
This doctrine was narrow and itechnical and was
frequently evailed. till it was never repudiated by
the courts of this State and remained the law until 1337
when by Chap. 537 of the Laws of that year it '.ias ,-ro-
vided:
Section 1. Any transfer or conveyance of real estate
hereafter made by a married man directly to his wife,
and every transfer or conveyance of real estate hereafter
made directly by a marr'ied woman to her husband, shall
not be invalid because such transfer or conveyance was
made directly firom one to the other without the inte.-
vention of a ',hird person.
Estates by the Entirety.
It is a familiar principle of the common law, that
in a conveyance of lands to husband and wife jointly,
they do not take as tenants in cormrnon nor as joint ten-
ants; but each becomes seized by the entirety, per tout
et non per *ay, and upon the death of either the whole
remaine to the survivor.
Soon after the passage of the Acts of 1343 and 1349
the courts were called upon to decide whether these Acts
had changed the common law in this respect. With re-
newed force it was insisted that the Act of 1860 had com.
pletely abrogated the coimmon law entirety estate.
latter Act provides that all property which cones to a
-,arried woman "bv descent, devise, bequest, gift or
grant--- shall notwithstanding her !.,arriage, be and re-
main her sole and separate property, and may be used,
collected and invested by her in hei' own name, and shall
not be subject to the interference or control of her
husband, or liable for his debts."
For many years it was uniformly held by the Supreme
Court that, notwithstanding those Acts, the husband. and
i-fe took as tenants by the entirety as at cor.mon law.
National Bank vs. Gregory, 4b Barb. , 165; Beach vs. Hol-
lister, - Hun, 519; Miller vs. Iiiller, 9 Abb. Pr., 444.
in 1379 the question, for the first time, was con-
siaered by the Court of Appeals in '.Iecker vs. Wright
Thi s
(70 N. Y. , 2(32) where it is discussed in an opinion by
Judge Danforth. He held that inasmuch as tho Act of
1800 gave the wife sole and separate management and own-
ership, of her property, free from the husband's control
or interference, and free ,'rom his debts, tenancy by
the entirety was abolishcd. It remained for the case
of Dertles vs. Nunan (92 N. Y., 152) to settle perma-
nently this questior, under the existing: statutes. Here
e
the question was directly 1rsented. After a thorough
consi.eration of the statutes and their effect on the
comnon law, a majority of the court repudiate the doc-
trine of -Meeker vs. Wright and determine that in re-
spect to estates by the entirety the comi-on law remains
unchanged. "The comn.on law incidents of marriage" say
the Court, "are swept away only by express enactments.--
Ve fail to find any reason for holdinig that the corntion
law rule as to the effect of a conveyance to husband and
wife has been abrogated. "
Zorntlein vs. Erai-, 100, N. Y., 12.
Actions by and against a Married Woman for "orts.
An univers;al rule at corn .on law was that in actions
for "tort coririitted by or against a marrieu woman the
iisband must be joined with the wife" and in all cases
the husband compensated or received compensation.
The Act of 1860 Chap. 90, Sec. 7, amended by Laws of
1362, Chap. 172, was the first to change this principle.
This Act authorizea and permitted a married woman to sue
and be sued in all matters relatinf to her spparate prop-
erty, and to bring and maintain an action in her own name
--or damages against any person or body corporate for any
injury to her person or character the same as if shie
were a feme sole. Under this statute she could sue and.
be su.ed alone for all torts relating to her property.
(Rowe vs. Smith, 4b 11. Y., 230; Baum vs. Mullen, 47 N. Y.,
577). Though she could not sue her husband for an in-
jury to her person (Schultz vs. Schultz, 3; N. Y., C44,
reversing 27 Bfun, 26), yet in Ball vs. Bullard, 52 Barb.,
141 it was held that the wife was entitled to damages
for a tort comrrritted on her person by one other than her
husband and that the husband was not a proper party plain-
tiff. Lais of 1330, Chap. 245, repealed Section 7, and
Ball vs. Bullard ceased to be authority. If' a wife
could now sue or be s.ed for a tort it must be by vir-
tue of Section 450 of the Uode of Civil Procedure which
in 1379 was amended to read as follows: "11n an action
o r special proceeding a married woman appears, prose-
cutes, or uefends alone or joined with other parties as
if she was single. It is not necessary or -roper to
jo-in ler husbanu. with her as a party in any action or
special proceeding affectinC her separate property."
In Fitzgerald vs. Quann (109 N. Y., 441) which was
an action to recover for an injury caused by the slan-
derous words spojken by the wife, the Court of Appeals
held that the cormion law liability of the husband for
the torts of his wife had not been abrogated either by
express legislation or by the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure. This -position was reiterated in
Mangam vs. Peck,ill N. Y., 401.
On the other hand, after hopeless conflict in the
Supreme Court (Ball vs. Burleson, 40 Alb. L. J., 305;
Campbell vs. Perry, id., 350), the Commission of Appeals
in an ingenious opinion insist that Section 450 of the
Code gives a married woman power to maintain an action
for an injury to her person.
N. Y., 584.
Bennett vs. Bennett, 116
This placed the husband in the incongru-
ous position that while he had been steipped of the
former rights acquired by marriage, he was still liable
as previously for the wife's torts.
I
Fuarther doubt or' contention is abated by Laws of
10)L, Chaps. 51 and 248. Chapter 51 provides that a
ariried woman shall have a right of action for injuries
to her person, her property or character and arising
out of her marital relation in all cases where an un-
married woman or a husband now has a right of action by
law; that the husband shall not be liable in damages
for his wife's wrongfful or toi-tious acts, nor for in-
juries to persons or property caused by the acts of the
Ylife, unless the '-cts wei-e done by actual coeicion or
instigation of the husband and in all cases embraced in
the second section the ,,ife shall be personally liable
for her wrongful or tortious acts. Chapter 248 which
takes effect Settember 1st, 1890, amends section 450
of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make it improp-
er to join the husband with the wife in an action brought
by or a;ainst the wife for a tort, and makes all sums
r -ecovered in an action as damages to the person, estate
or character of the wife, her separate proper-ty.
Few changes are now necessary to place a married
woman, in respect to property rights, on an equality with
As the courts are reluctant to construea ferule sole.
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the existing statutes beyond their clearly -xpressed
import, it devolves upon the Legislature to remove the
remaining oppressive principles of the comnon law; and
in so far as consonanit with justice, and the unity of
t-arital relations their removal is inevitable.
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